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This paper presents a model of legal migration of temporary skilled workers from one source 
country to two host countries, both of which can control their levels of such immigration.  
Because of complementarities between capital and labor, the return on capital is positively 
related to the level of immigration.  Consequently, when capital is immobile, host nations’ 
optimal levels of immigration are positively related to their capital endowments.  Further, when 
capital is mobile between the host nations, the common return on capital is a function of the 
levels of immigration in both countries, meaning that immigration is a public good.  As a result, 
when immigration imposes costs on host countries, the Nash equilibrium results in free riding 
and less immigration than would occur in the cooperative equilibrium.  These results are 
qualitatively unaltered when capital mobility extends to the source nation. 
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1.    Introduction 
 
Immigration policy occupies a central place in policy discussions for most developed 
nations.  Increasing globalization has also meant increased movement of skilled labor from 
developing to developed nations.  For example, nations like China and India have abundant 
skilled labor, but lack infrastructure and complementary inputs.  This has kept wages much lower 
than in developed nations and has led to employers in labor-scarce nations to pressure for the 
relaxation of immigration restrictions.  It is well known, for example, that major U.S. firms like 
Microsoft lobby the government to relax the quota imposed by H1 type visas for temporary 
workers.  A quote from Bhagwati (2003) summarizes the situation aptly: 
 “…developed countries’ appetite for skilled migrants has grown – just look at Silicon 
Valley’s large supply of successful Indian and Taiwanese computer scientists and 
venture capitalists.  The enhanced appetite for such professionals reflects the shift to a 
globalized economy in which countries compete for markets by creating and attracting 
technically skilled talent.  Governments also perceive these workers to be more likely to 
assimilate quickly into their new societies.”  
Borjas (2000) mirrors this view in his analysis of the effects of skilled immigration through 
complementary effects on native capital and knowledge externalities to native workers.
1   
  This paper addresses this interdependence in immigration policy, especially in the context 
of skilled immigrants who are perceived to be temporary workers.  While immigration policy in 
the United States is largely considered to be a bilateral issue between the source nation (say 
India) and the host nation (U.S.), it is clear that immigration of skilled labor to the United States 
has spillover effects on other potential host nations and vice versa.  If immigration raises the 
return on capital, capital will flow into that nation.  The capital outflow from the other developed 
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nations will affect both their wages and national income.  Thus, the immigration level chosen by 
one host nation affects another.  Although this is recognized in the literature, its analysis has not 
developed at a sufficient level.
2   
  We address the issue of interdependence between host nations with a three-nation model 
where immigrants from a source developing nation (say S) migrate to two developed host nations 
(H and F).  H and F are developed nations with superior technology (relative to S) associated 
with higher marginal product of labor and consequently higher wages.  Immigration policy is 
determined through a government quota and, as a result, there is a wedge between wages in the 
host and source nations.   
  Host nations incur assimilation costs in making an immigrant suitable for the domestic 
workplace and to be responsible residents.  Part of these costs may be internal to the firm – like 
work related training etc.  The rest are social costs that pertain to cultural assimilation of the 
immigrants.  It is well documented in the literature that assimilation entails real resource costs 
for an economy.  Consider, for example, proficiency in the host nation’s official language.  
Dustmann and van Soest (2002) write: 
 “…one question relevant to that issue is how strongly language proficiency influences 
economic assimilation.  If good knowledge of the dominant language increases 
productivity by a sufficient amount, governments may find it advantageous to provide 
an appropriate infrastructure for language acquisition to support this process, and to 
encourage the immigrant population to learn the dominant language.  It is therefore 
important to obtain an accurate estimate of the effect of language on earnings.”   
 
Using German data, they find significant effects of acquisition of the German language on the 
earnings of immigrants.  Along similar lines, Meng and Gregory (2005) look at the effect of 
inter-marriage between immigrants and natives to look for assimilation effects.  They find that 
intermarried immigrants earn significantly higher incomes compared to nonintermarried ones.  
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They control for other mitigating factors and conclude that this premium derives from better 
assimilation that intermarriage facilitates. 
  In the benchmark case in which capital is immobile, the immigration policies of the two 
host nations H and F are independent of each other.  Each host nation chooses immigration 
levels that equate the marginal gains for domestic capitalists to the marginal social (or 
assimilation) costs of immigration.  A rise in immigration to nation j reduces the capital-to-labor 
ratio and the wage rate.  The loss to native labor is a transfer that accrues to domestic capital, so 
the transfer makes no difference in terms of national income.
3  As the wage rate falls, however, 
immigrants are paid less, leading to an effective terms-of-trade gain in the factor market.  This 
gain accrues as higher return for domestic capital, resulting in a net marginal benefit from 
immigration for a host nation.   
  In the presence of capital mobility, there are two scenarios.  First, capital may be mobile 
between the host nations but immobile between the host nations and the source nation.  This 
might be due, for example, to significant barriers to international capital mobility in developing 
nations (like a lack of currency convertibility, restrictions on the participation of foreign holders 
in equity markets, etc.).  The alternative scenario has freely mobile capital between the 
developed and developing nations.  Section 3 of the paper analyzes the first scenario, while 
section 4 extends it to the second.  Some ambiguities do arise in the latter case, but the main 
thrust of the results from section 3 is unaffected.   
  When capital is mobile between H and F only, a rise in the immigration quota by H will 
raise the demand for capital as more of it will be required to complement immigrant labor at the 
prevailing capital intensity.  This will raise the demand for capital in the global capital market 
and raise its price, leading to two effects.  The first is a terms-of-trade benefit from a reduction in 
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payment to immigrants (similar to the immobility case).  The second effect comes into play 
through the capital market.  If H is a net exporter (importer) of capital, it will gain from a rise 
(fall) in the rental rate.  At the optimal immigration level, the marginal gains from these two 
effects are equated to the marginal cost of immigration that is external to the firm (say marginal 
external cost).  The relaxation of the immigration quota by H affects the other host nation F 
through the effect on the global capital market.  Nation F’s capitalists gain, prompting F to adjust 
its optimal immigration level.  In other words, H and F’s immigration policies have positive 
spillover effects on each other.  In the Nash equilibrium, immigration levels are too low from a 
cooperative point of view.  Because the positive externalities created by one nation on the other 
are not internalized in the process of unilateral optimization, there is a coordination failure that is 
quite similar to the problems that have been noted in the tax competition or multi-country trade 
taxation literatures.
4   
  If the production functions of the two nations are identical, the international rate of return 
on capital is a function of the joint immigration levels of H and F.  In other words, global 
immigration becomes a public good.  In turn, this means that the marginal benefit of H (or F) is a 
function of global immigration and is independent of its location.  The marginal external cost is, 
however, location-specific and, hence, private.  The result is a typical free rider equilibrium in 
which only one nation allows immigration.  
   The remainder of the paper contains four sections.  Section 2 presents the optimal choice 
of immigration in the absence of capital mobility.  Section 3 considers capital mobility between 
the two host nations.  Section 4 discusses the implications for capital mobility between the host 
and source nations.  Section 5 concludes.   
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2.     The Model with Immobile Capital  
  We present a standard single-good model that is used often to analyze factor mobility.
5  
This section analyzes the home nation alone because H and F are independent in terms of their 
policy decisions in the absence of capital mobility, and the analysis for F simply mirrors that of 
H.  Country H produces a single good X using labor (L) and capital (K), and a constant returns to 
scale (CRS) technology: 
(, ) X XLK = .          ( 1 )  
Let firms in H be perfectly competitive, w be the wage rate of natives, and wI the wage rate of an 
immigrant worker.
6  The training (or assimilation) costs internal to the firm bis cf  per immigrant 
worker, and r is the rental on capital.  The first order conditions for profit maximization are: 
   1(1, ) ( ), ,
K
Xkww w k k
L
=⇒= = and,  I ww c f = + .      (2)                         
     22 0( 1 , ) ( ) X rr X k r r k − =⇒= ⇒= .              (3) 
Using CRS properties we get 
  () ( 1 ,) () wk X k k rk = − .            (4) 
Let I be the level of immigration, while L andK  are H’s endowments of labor and capital, 
respectively.  Therefore, 
   () , 0
K
LLI k kk I k
LI
′ =+⇒= ⇒= <
+
.             (5) 
Using (1) through (5) and assuming that the government does not include immigrant income in 
national income (NI), we have the following expression:
7
() { 1 , ( ) } ( ) If NI L I X k I w c I cI = +− + − ,               (6a) 
where c is the constant marginal assimilation cost of immigrants that is external to the firm. 
Alternately, (6a) can be written as: 
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    () { 1 , ( ) } NI L I X k I wI cI = +− − .                (6b) 
Using (6b), the first-order condition for the maximization of national income (through the choice 
of an optimal immigration level) is 
  0 I
dNI dw dr
I cI k c I k r c
dI dI dI
⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ =− − = − = ⇒ = ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠




= ,  
     and, 
I dw dw
dI dI
=       ( 7 )  
A marginal increase in I reduces w (and wI) and, therefore, the payment to labor.  The fall in the 
wage rate implies a rise in the return on capital.  The loss in income for native labor is offset 
completely by the gains to capital.  In addition, domestic capital gains because of the loss in 
payments to the immigrants, which is a terms-of-trade gain in the factor market and shows up as 
a net marginal benefit from immigration in (7).
8  At the optimum, this benefit equals the 
marginal external cost of immigration.  Relation (7) defines the optimal immigration level 
implicitly as 
(, , ) I IcLK = .                   (8) 
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0 = <⇒ >⇒ <,         (9a) 
where SOC<0 is the second-order condition for the optimal immigration problem.  Thus, a rise in 
the marginal external cost of immigration will reduce its level and also reduce the return on 
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because, using (3) and (5) and ignoring the third derivative of the production function, 
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Therefore, a rise in the capital endowment will raise the optimal immigration level.  Using (3) 
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.                   (10b) 
  This finding is interesting because it suggests that in a two-host-country setup, ceteris-
paribus, the nation having the larger endowment of capital has the higher return on capital.  
Thus, if H is capital-abundant it will have the incentive to import capital.  This is counter-
intuitive at first glance, but makes sense when one considers the complementarity between 
immigration and capital.
10  From (9b) we see that a capital-abundant nation will have a higher 
optimal immigration level, which in turn raises the marginal product of capital and the rate of 
return on capital. 
 
3.  Capital Mobility between Host Nations 
  This section explores the consequences of capital mobility between H and F and assumes 
that S is not connected to the global capital market (an assumption that is relaxed in the next 
section).  It is useful to look at the current context for two reasons.  The first is the analytical 
simplicity it offers and therefore the clarity of the results that we can obtain.  The second is that 
for many developing nations capital mobility suffers from several barriers, so the abstraction 
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from universal capital mobility has an element of realism.
11  All F-nation variables are marked 
by an asterisk.   
  The capital market equilibrium condition is 
 
** * * * () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ,
WW KK KK K LI k r L Ik r K rr I I += += ⇒+ ++ = ⇒ =
* ) ,          (11) 
where 
** * 0




I LI k r L Ikr
∂
== − >
∂ ′ ′ ++ +
 
because   (since  0 /   and   0 / ) (
* * < = < = ′
′ dr dk k dr dk r k 22 X <0 and 
*
22 X <0).  Similarly, 
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*
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  Under capital mobility H’s national income is 
** () [ 1 , { ( , ) } ] [ { ( , ) } ] E NI L I X k r I I w k r I I I cI rK =+ − − + ,           (12) 
where  () E K KKK LI k =−=−+  is the net exports of capital by H to F.  We assume that I and 
I
* are chosen simultaneously by H and F under the Nash assumption that I
* is given when 
choosing its optimal I.  Assuming an interior solution, national income in H is maximized when  
 () EI Ik K r c 0 + −=.                    (13a) 
A rise in immigration raises the return on capital, which benefits H on two counts: As in the 
previous section, a rise in the rental rate is beneficial because it lowers the wage bill going to the 
immigrants, an effect measured by the term I Ikr .  In addition, there is a gain (or loss) from capital 
exports (or imports), which is measured by  .  This occurs through the effect of immigration 
on the international rental rate.  If immigration raises r, it must benefit H’s capital in F (i.e.,  ).  
This occurs because under constant returns to scale, the wage rate in F must fall, benefiting both 
EI Kr
E K
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its capitalists and the foreign capital that was exported by H.  In equilibrium, the sum of these 
two effects is balanced against c.  Relation (13a) defines H’s Nash reaction function implicitly: 
 
* (; ,,) I II cKL = .                   (13b) 
Analogously, F’s first-order condition and Nash reaction function are, respectively, 
  *
** * * () E I Ik K r c 0 + −=  and                (14a) 
 
** * * * (; , , ) I II cKL = .                     (14b) 
Simultaneous solution of (13a) and (14a) yields the Nash equilibrium 
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Further, it can be shown that 
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Using (11), we know that   and   are both positive.  Thus, because k I r * I r ′ and  are both 













.              (17) 
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The first-order conditions imply that ( ) E IkK + and 
** * ( E) I kK +  are both positive.  Using (16a), 
(16b), and (17), it is clear that the slopes of the reaction functions can be positive or negative.  
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It can be shown that 
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.           (20) 
From (20), in the Nash equilibrium H has a local incentive to pre-commit to a higher (lower) 
immigration level if F views I as a strategic complement (substitute) for I
*.  Using (16b) and 
(17), I is a strategic complement for I
* if and only if 











.                   (21) 
  Finally, it is worth noting that because of positive spillovers, Nash-equilibrium 
immigration levels are likely to be too low compared to the cooperative levels.  Consider, for 
example, the joint national income of H and F: 
  .                    (22) 
** * (, ) (, ) (, )
W N I II N III N I II =+
*
Partials of the joint national income are 
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Evaluated at the Nash equilibrium, these reduce to 
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.           (24b) 
From (24a) and (24b), it is clear that, starting from the Nash equilibrium, there is a local 
incentive to raise both I and I
* to achieve a cooperative equilibrium.  Consider (24a), a rise in  I 
will raise the rental r and benefit F’s capital to the tune of 
** * ( EI ) I kK r + .  This is a positive 
externality of H’s immigration policy on F, and is not internalized in the unilateral choice of H’s 
national income maximizing immigration level.  Consequently from a joint national income 
maximization perspective, the level of immigration chosen by H is too low.  Similar logic applies 
to (24b), which reflects F’s choice of Nash immigration level.  Therefore, both nations choose 
immigration levels that are too low because they ignore the effect of their choice on the other 
nation.  The result is a Nash immigration equilibrium with levels that are too low relative to a 
cooperative outcome.     
  Turning our attention to the special case of identical production functions in H and F, 
(11) can be written as 
  *
** * * ( ) ( ) () ()
W
II I kr L L I I K r rI I r r I I r ++ + = ⇒ = + ⇒= + =.                (25) 
For H, the marginal benefit from immigration is 
 
** ( ) [ { () } ] () (
H HH
EI I
* ) MB I kKr KL k r II r II M B M BII =+ =− + +⇒ = +.        (26a) 
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Similarly, for F, 
 
** * * * [ { () } ] () ()
FF
I
F MB K L k r I I r I I MB MB I I =− + + ⇒ = + .           (26b) 
In this case we have the possibility of a corner solution.  Suppose that H and F have identical 
marginal external costs of immigration (i.e., 
* cc = ).  Also assume that H has larger endowments 
of both labor and capital compared to F.  In this case, H will have an interior solution and F will 
have a corner solution (i.e.,  ) if and only if 






MB MB K Lk K L k k
LL
−
>⇒ − > − ⇒ <
−
.                   (27) 
[Figure 1 around here] 
This is a Nash equilibrium where the optimal immigration for F is zero.
12  Notice, however, that 
if F added a unit of immigration at the margin, the sum of the benefit from it for H and F would 
have exceeded the marginal external cost to F.  Thus, we have a free rider problem (as in the 
case of a public good).  Because r is a function of the sum of the two nations’ immigration 
levels, global immigration is a pure pubic good and is underprovided.  Figure 1 illustrates this 
free-riding equilibrium for  .  At 
* cc = Nash I , H is at an interior optimum, but F’s marginal benefit 
from immigration is lower than its marginal cost.  There is no reason for F to choose a positive 
immigration level of its own, although the resulting immigration level is sub-optimal from a 
cooperative perspective. 
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Using (27) and (28), the condition for 
H F MBM B > boils down to 
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W * I KL K L K K >− − .                  (29) 
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If global immigration is positive, then a sufficient condition for (29) to be satisfied is 







−< ⇒ > , assuming 
* KK > .                 (30) 
Therefore, (30) suggests that if H is larger than F in terms of their endowments, then a sufficient 
condition for H to provide for global immigration while F free rides is that H is capital-abundant 
relative to F.  In the general case in which the marginal external costs might differ, H will 
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4.  Capital Mobility between Host and Source Nations 
  It is useful to see how capital mobility among H, F, and S affects our findings.  In what 
follows, all variables are denoted as in the previous sections and the superscript S refers to nation 
S.  Let the production function in S be CRS in labor and capital and be of the following form: 
(, )
SS S S X XL K = , where, 
* (
SS LL I I =− + )  and 
SS
E
S K KK =−.                 (32) 
  Using (32) the capital market equilibrium is 
** SS KK K KK K K ++= ++= ⇒
W  
** * * * ( )() ( ) () { ( ) } (, )
SS W LI k r L Ik r L II k K rr I I ++ + + − += ⇒ = .                    (33) 
Using (33), 
** * * ()
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*
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′ ′ ++ + + − +
0 r  as  .     (34b) 
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S ko r k ><
From (34a) and (34b), we can see that there is an ambiguity about the effect of a rise in the 
immigration quotas on the international rate of return on capital.  If capital intensity in S is higher 
than that in H and F, then the effect of the immigration quotas on the return on capital is 
reversed.  It is probably more realistic, however, to concentrate on the case where the developed 
host nations have a higher capital intensity compared to S.  In that case, the effect of immigration 
on r is as in the previous analysis, and the thrust of the results is unaffected.  Finally, let us note 
that if the host nations have identical technology, then (33) may be written as 
** * () { ( ) } { ( ) } ( )
SS W kr L L I I L I I k K r rI I +++ + −+ = ⇒ = +
* .                       (35) 
Expression (35) is similar to (25) in that the rental function is additive in its arguments.  This 
implies that the public good nature of global immigration obtains even in this case.  This results 
in a free riding and globally sub-optimal immigration equilibrium. 
 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
  This paper considered optimal immigration policy as it pertains to skilled temporary 
immigrants.  Mobility of capital and capital-labor complementarities mean that host countries’ 
policies are interdependent.  As a result, market failures associated with externality and public 
good problems arise when host nations do not coordinate their immigration policies.  While our 
context is somewhat distinct from Zimmermann’s (2005) discussion on the coordination 
problems within the European Union, the analysis should shed light on the European context.  
For example, it would be interesting to explore potential harmonization of policies toward illegal 
immigrants.  Zimmermann discusses this issue, but we have not seen a formal analysis of it.  ■ 
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1 The importance of immigration in terms of its impact on the host economy is highlighted in Freeman (2004).  He 
suggests that for several reasons immigration may have more significant effects than trade flows.  One reason is the 
presence of non-traded goods in the product mix.  Another is that a large volume of trade occurs between developed 
nations with similar factor endowments and thereby not contributing to factor price equalization as predicted by neo-
classical trade theory.  On the other hand, immigration happens more from developing to developed nations, 
significantly affecting the mix of skilled to unskilled labor in the host nation.  This issue is not the focus of this 
paper, but it does go to show the importance of immigration in framing economic policy.             
2 For example, see Fuess (2003) for a discussion about the favorable sentiment in Japan in the 1990s towards skilled 
immigration to help the nation regain international competitiveness at a time when Japan was suffering from an 
economic slump.  Also, although the context is different, Zimmermann’s (2005) focus on the necessity of EU-wide 
harmonization of immigration policies (for non-EU source nations) is related.  For example, he aptly summarizes the 
interdependence of immigration polices as follows: “There is a need to harmonize the single-country migration 
policies across Europe….  An inflow of non-EU labour immigrants in one country may affect the economies in all 
European Union partner countries through externalities in immigration like illegal flows, forced mobility of the 
natives, or adjustments through the capital and goods markets.”    
3 Note that this is completely consistent with the findings of Borjas (2003), among others, suggesting that 
immigration has a negative effect on the wages/employment opportunities of native workers.  The point of departure 
here is that we consider the aggregate effect on the nation, and, therefore, a loss to the workers is washed out by a 
gain to employers.  We should also note that, in the presence of complementarities between different types of 
workers, the effect of immigration on native workers need not be negative.  In our model the immigrants and native 
workers are perfect substitutes as far as the production function goes.  If one allows for imperfect substitutability in 
the production function, then, of course, the negative impact might be mitigated.  In a recent contribution, Ottaviano 
and Peri (2005) take this approach and find large positive effects of immigration on the wages of U.S.-born workers.  
It is the complementarities between immigrants and natives that drive their findings.        
4 See for example Wilson (1999) for the tax competition issue.  Regions set taxes too low in a competition to attract 
capital.  The taxes are too low in the sense that each region ignores the negative (positive) externality of lowering 
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(raising) taxes on a rival region.  If this externality is internalized taxes are higher.  In a different context, Panagariya 
and Schiff (1994), Rodrik (1995), and Bandyopadhyay (1996) note that taxation of primary commodity exports by 
one exporting nation drives up its price for others.  In that sense, there are positive terms-of-trade externalities that 
are not internalized by Nash taxes.  The resulting taxes are sub-optimal.      
5 See for example Ethier (1986), Bond and Chen (1987), etc. for single-good models with a focus on the general 
equilibrium linkages between the goods and factor markets.  Borjas (2001) also uses a one-good model to look at the 
effects of immigration when there are regional differences in wages.  While it is not difficult to use a multi-good, 
multi-factor model, it complicates the analysis needlessly.   Since our focus is on factor mobility, we abstract from 
that issue.    
6 This formulation allows for the possibility that immigrant workers may earn a different wage compared to natives.  
If we drop this distinction the qualitative conclusions of the paper do not change. 
7 There is a well-established literature debating whether immigrant incomes should be included in economic 
analyses of national income.  We assume that it is not included in national income.  As far as the policy decision 
regarding immigration goes, this makes sense.  This is because ex-ante, there is no reason why the government 
should care about immigrant incomes when it is trying to decide whether to let in another immigrant.  At that stage, 
the immigrant is not yet part of the economy.  However, ex-post, inclusion or exclusion may both be justified 
depending on the context. 
8 What is necessary for this marginal benefit to be positive is that the host countries are large in the factor markets, 
so that immigration can affect factor rewards.  This requirement continues to hold in the future sections where we 
consider capital mobility.  However, immigration is not unlimited because there is a positive marginal external cost 
that society bears.    
9 The proof is available from the authors on request. 
10 This is consistent with Freeman (2004) who writes: “In theory, global capital markets send capital from advanced 
countries to poor countries…the major importer of foreign capital has been the US, whose stability and 
technological progress has attracted foreign investment….” 
11 Consider the case of India, which, for a long time had quite closed trade and capital markets.  With recent 
liberalization, that is changing, but there are still a lot of restrictions in the capital market.  Foreign equity 
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participation is limited, currency convertibility in the capital account is pending, and direct foreign investment is 
carefully monitored.  Many other developing nations share such restrictions.        
12 The corner solution in which one country will allow zero immigration in equilibrium is rather implausible and 
follows from our assumption of constant marginal assimilation costs.  If we instead had increasing marginal 
assimilation costs, we could obtain interior solutions for both host countries.  Immigration levels would still be sub-
optimal because of the public good aspect of the model. 
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